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The trade of genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") has become a
source of controversy around the world. While industrialized countries
generally argue for limited regulations on GMOs to facilitate trade of these
products, most nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") and developing
countries have called for the adoption of a stringent protocol that regulates
the trade of GMOs.' Under the Convention on Biological Diversity
("CBD"), an international multilateral environmental agreement established
to regulate biodiversity, 130 countries have developed and adopted a bio-
'J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Northwestern University School of Law, B.A., 1996, Wash-
ington University. I would like to thank Professor Anthony D'Amato and Marybelle Ang
for their helpful comments and suggestions for this article. I would also like to thank Elissa
Germaine and my family for their constant loyal support.
' See Thomas P. Redick et al., Private Legal Mechanisms For Regulating The Risks of
Genetically Modified Organisms: An Alternative Path Within The Biosafety Protocol, 4
ENvT. LAW. 1, 7-8 (1997).
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safety protocol that establishes standard international regulations governing
the transboundary movement of living modified organisms ("LMOs").2
In a meeting in Cartagena, Colombia in February 1999, parties to the
CBD, known as the Conference of the Parties ("COP"), could not agree on
the proposed biosafety protocol drafted in prior meetings.3 However, in
January 2000, in a meeting in Montreal, the parties to the CBD finally
adopted the draft protocol, naming it the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
("Cartagena Protocol or Protocol"). 4 When the Cartagena Protocol opened
for signature at the CBD's COP meeting in Nairobi in May 2000, sixty-four
governments and the European Union signed the Protocol . Presently,
eighty-one parties have signed the Protocol, while only two have ratified it.
6
However, the Protocol will only enter into legal force after fifty parties have
ratified it.
7
This comment argues that each party to the COP should ratify and im-
plement the Protocol as soon as possible. This comment also critiques the
provisions of the Protocol and alternatives to the Protocol, namely the vol-
untary regulation of GMOs. Part II begins with a discussion of the back-
ground of GMOs. Next, Part III discusses the World Trade Organization's
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
("SPS Agreement") and its agricultural safety provisions. Part IV continues
with a description of the CBD, the history of the development of the Cart-
agena Protocol, and a discussion of important Protocol language. Part V
analyzes the merits of the Protocol and why it should be ratified and im-
plemented. Finally, this comment concludes with a discussion of alterna-
tives to the Protocol, with an emphasis on voluntary regulations.
2 See Bill Lambrecht, Compromise Is Proposed For Pact On Genetically Altered Prod-
ucts; New Rules Could Exempt Some Farm Commodities, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb.
22, 1999, atA5.
3Id.
4 Press Release, Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
Adopted (29 Jan. 2000), at http://www.biodiv.org/press/pr-2000-01-28-biosafety.htmn/cbdre
pi.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol Press Release].
5 George Mwagni, Environmental-Safeguards Agreed On, ASSOCIATED PREss, May 26,
2000.
6 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (29 Jan.
2000), at http:llwww.biodiv.orgfbiosafe/protocol/signinglist.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2001)
[hereinafter Cartagena Signing List].
7 Cartagena Protocol Press Release, supra note 4.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Genetically Modified Organisms
Genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") include plants and animals
that scientists have genetically altered.8 Living modified organisms
("LMOs") 9 are defined as "any living organism[s] that possess[1 a novel
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modem bio-
technology."10 By manipulating DNA, scientists can engineer plants and
animals to have particular traits." Scientists can use gene-splicing tech-
nologies, transferring genes from one plant to another to create a "trans-
genic" plant, one with new characteristics.12  For example, Monsanto
Corporation, of St. Louis, Missouri, manufactures Roundup Ready soybean
seeds that are genetically engineered to be resistant to certain insects.
There are two methods of genetically engineering plants: (1) enhanced
seed systems and (2) transgenic seeds.14 First, enhanced seed systems allow
the seed and a chemical to work in conjunction with one another.' 5 For ex-
ample, Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybeans are designed to be resistant to
glyphosate, a chemical used in Monsanto's herbicide Roundup Ultra.'
6
Thus, farmers of Roundup Ready soybean crops can use Roundup Ready
Ultra herbicides on their fields without killing the soybeans.17 Second,
transgenic seeds produce plants "designed to kill predators or to enhance a
certain property, such as oil or sugar content."' For example, Bacillus
8 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 6.
9 The Protocol uses the term "living modified organisms". This article uses the terms
"genetically modified organisms" and 'living modified organisms" interchangeably - a
common practice used in public debate on the subject.
10 Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference to the Parties to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), at http://www.biodi
v.org/excopl/cbdrepi.html (last visited Oct. 31, 1999) [hereinafter BSWG Report 6].
1 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 6.
12 Bill Lambrecht, World Recoils at Monsanto's Brave New Crops; The St. Louis Com-
pany's Political Clout Has Turned the President and Cabinet Secretarties into Pitchmen, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al.
13 Jack Epstein. Brazil Battles Over Ban on Altered Beans, WASH. Tuvms, Aug. 30, 1999,
atA14.
14 Susan Boensch Meyer, Land and Resource Management: Genetically Modified Or-




1 Id. at 103 (quoting Ronald E. Yates, Genetic Engineering Moves into Corn, Soy Beans,
"Break-through" Seeds Likely to Boost Yields, Transform Industries, Ciu. Tam., Mar. 17,
1996, at Cl).
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thuringiensis corn hybrid (Bt corn) is designed to destroy the European corn
borer, an insect that plagues corn fields across the world.' 9
There are only a few major manufacturers of GMOs.2 Monsanto, the
world's second-largest seed and third-largest agrochemical company, is the
world leader in the production of GMOs.2' Opposition to the release of
GMOs into the environment often targets its protests against Monsanto.22
However, other companies, such at Novartis, a Swiss Company, and
AgrEvo, a German company, also use gene-altering technologies to produce
GMOs .
After companies produce GMOs, they attempt to sell their products to
customers who will use them. Experts refer to the use of GMOs as deliber-
ate release.24 Deliberate release is the introduction of GMOs into the envi-
romnent. Controversy stems from the deliberate release of GMOs,
including both enhanced seed systems and transgenic seeds.26
B. Potential Benefits of GMOs
Monsanto and other GMO manufacturers market their products as tools
to feed the world and protect the environment.2 7 A current global environ-
mental concern is how to create an adequate food supply as the world's
population increases.2 1 Monsanto argues that if farmers use genetically al-
tered seeds that are resistant to pests and plant viruses, they can increase
crop yield without having to convert additional lands for agricultural uses.2 9
Scientists genetically engineer crops to resist plant viruses that would oth-
erwise destroy part of the crop.30 Thus, genetically modified crops contain
less viral contamination than unmodified crops, increasing both crop yield
and quality.3 1 Biotechnology companies also contend that future technol-
ogy may allow for the creation of more nutritious foods and perhaps even
foods that could prevent or treat illness3 2
19 See Meyer, supra note 14, at 102.
20 See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 59.
21 Epstein, supra note 13, at A14.
22 id.
23 id.
24 Anne Marie Solberg, Genetically Engineered Produce Travels North America Under
NAFTA: An Issue Ripe for Consideration, 18 HAmIlNE L. R.Ev. 551, 555 (1995).25 Id.
26 See id.
27 Tom Rhodes, Bitter Harvest: The Real Story of Monsanto and GM Food, SuN. TINEs
(LoNDoN), August 22, 1999, at 1.28 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 7.
29 Id.
30 Solberg, supra note 24, at 554.
31 Id.
32 See David Barboza, Biotech Companies Take On Critics of Gene-Altered Food, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1999, atAl.
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In addition, farmers and consumers are concerned with the amount of
herbicides and pesticides used in farming practices today.33 Scientists have
used biotechnology to develop herbicide and pest-resistant crops that can
potentially decrease the amount of pesticides and herbicides released into
the environment.34
Farmers may also gain an economic benefit by using genetically al-
tered seeds. For example, in the United States, Canada, and Argentina,
farmers grow genetically altered soybeans commercially in order to in-
crease crop yield.3 5 Thus, in countries like Brazil, which also compete as
world leaders in the soybean market, farmers argue for the use of geneti-
cally altered crops to maintain a competitive edge in crop yield.36
C. Potential Dangers of GMOs
Opponents to the deliberate release of GMOs argue that there are
potential dangers in the use of GMOs--specifically, dangers to human
health and the environment. 37 The biological and ecological sciences can-
not surely predict that the deliberate release of GMOs will be harmless.
38
While supporters of GMOs argue that their release will benefit hu-
mans, opponents contend that there are risks of potential side effects on
human health.39 For example, in August 1999, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, the United Nations Food Safety Agency, ruled unanimously
to enforce a 1993 European moratorium on Monsanto's genetically engi-
neered hormonal milk ("rBGIT). 4° The European Commission's public
health committee confirmed that the genetic alteration of rBGH increased
levels of naturally occurring Insulin like Growth Factor One ("IBF 1") in
milk.41 Those increased levels of IBF 1 both potentially increased the risks
of cancer and promoted the growth of cancer cells in humans.42
Another potential problem for human consumption stems from the al-
teration of proteins in foods derived from genetically engineered crops. 43Genes encode proteins, and when scientists alter the genetic makeup of
33 Solberg, supra note 24, at 553.
34 id.
35 Epstein, supra note 13, at A14.
31 See id.
37 Solberg, supra note 24, at 555.
38 Id. at 554-555.
39 See id. at 556.
40 Press Release, Monsanto's Genetically Modified Milk Ruled Unsafe by the United Na-
tions, Chemical Business Newsbase, (Aug. 25, 1999).
41 id.
42 Id.
43 Solberg, supra note 24, at 556.
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seeds, new proteins may form. 4 Changes in the level and form of proteins,
in addition to increases in the levels of other constituents that affect protein
absorption, may inhibit the way the human body absorbs proteins. 45
Genetic engineering could also increase levels of toxins in crops. 4
Plants produce natural toxins, and foods generated from non-engineered
plants contain a safe level of toxins.47 Genetically engineered plants may
manufacture new proteins that could potentially increase the level of these
naturally occurring toxins.48 Thus, food from genetically engineered crops
may contain levels of toxicity dangerous to human health.49
Finally, genetic modification can dangerously change the level of al-
lergens in foods.50 For example, scientists found soybeans modified from
brazil nuts to contain brazil nut allergens, posing potential health problems
for those allergic to nuts. 1 Other modified soybeans were found to contain
27% more trypsin-inhibitor, a major allergen, than unmodified soybeans. 52
Therefore, consumers must consider the potential danger of allergens when
eating genetically altered foods.
In addition to potential dangers to human health, some scientists argue
that the deliberate release of GMOs poses potential threats to the environ-
ment 3 The greatest source of apprehension for ecological scientists is the
potential danger of the introduction of non-native organisms into foreign
environments .54
One danger is the hybridization of GMOs and naturally occurring mi-
croorganisms-a process called outcrossing.55 Genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms have the potential to exchange genetic material, or hybridize,
with natural occurring microorganisms.5 6 This hybridization, or outcross-
ing, can potentially disrupt the ecology of an environment 7 For example,
wheat that is genetically engineered to resist certain pests can pass this





4 Solberg, supra note 24, at 556.49 Id.
50 Holly Saigo, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Negotiation of the Biosafety Protocol,
12 GEo. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 779, 792 (2000).
51 See id.
52Id.
53 See Judy J. Kim, Out of the Lab and Into the Field: Harmonization of Deliberate Re-
lease Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1160, 1163
(1992-93).
54 See id. at 1166.55 See id. at 1168; see also Saigo, supra note 50, at 787.56 Kim, supra note 53, at 1167.
57 See id. at 1168.
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disrupting the environment.58 Although outcrossing commonly occurs in
conventional agronomy, a recent study has discovered that genes from
transgenic plants may be twenty times more likely to hybridize into relative
species than a plant's natural genes.5 9
Another potential danger of the deliberate release of GMOs is the risk
to wildlife.6 For example, English Nature, a British environmental group,
has posited that releasing untested GMO crops could cause bird species,
such as the skylark, corn bunting, and linnet, to become extinct because
GMO crops may displace the seeds and insects they eat.61
Because of these potential health and environmental dangers, the par-
ties to the CBD should ratify the Protocol in order to implement the stan-
dard set of regulations established in the Protocol. These regulations should
reduce the potential dangers of the release of GMOs into the environment,
while allowing the trade and development of GMO products to continue in
a controlled manner.
m11. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S AGREEMENT ON THE
APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
Treaties that govern international trade include provisions to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health.62 However, while these regulations
provide helpful guidance in the creation of a biosafety protocol, they do not
specifically address the dangers accompanied by the trade of GMOs. 63 For
example, in 1994, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), an international
world trading regime, was established to increase free trade amongst its par-
ties.64 Under the WTO umbrella agreement, parties established the WTO
structure, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS Agreement"), and other agreements to which all member
states must subscribe.65 Under GATT, member states must "enter into 're-
58 Id.
59 Saigo, supra note 50, at 787.60 See Meyer, supra note 14, at 102.
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IA, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J.
DAVEY, & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., 1995 DocmrMNrs SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, at 121 (3rd ed. 1995) [hereinafter SPS Agreement];
see also Solberg, supra note 24, at 561-564 (for a similar discussion regarding NAFTA's
sanitary and phytosanitary standards).
63 For a discussion of how the Cartagena Protocol specifically addresses these dangers,
see infra Section V.
6 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HoWsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 25 (2d ed. 1999).
6 See id.
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ciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of dis-
criminatory treatment in international commerce." '66
The WTO governs the trade of agricultural products under the SPS
Agreement.67 The SPS Agreement allows its members to establish regula-
tions to protect human, animal, and plant life from the potential dangers
posed by agricultural trade, such as pests, contaminants, toxins, or disease-
carrying organisms.6 It provides "a legal framework which can address the
fundamental issue of whether a measure validly exists to protect consumers
or is merely a sham to protect domestic producers. 69
The SPS Agreement gives its member countries some discretion in de-
termining which sanitary and phytosanitary measures to use to protect plant
and animal life.70 A member country determines the specific risks of ani-
mal or plant pests or disease in a particular region, taking into account
available scientific evidence. 71 That country can then adopt sanitary or phy-
tosanitary measures to adequately address the possible danger, as long as
those measures do not "result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade."72
Because the WTO is an effort to loosen trade restrictions amongst
member countries, it allows member countries to maintain some autonomy
in establishing their own safety standards. 73 However, to achieve harmoni-
zation, the SPS Agreement requires that members base their measures on
international standards where those standards exist.74 In addition, members
must accept measures from other countries if an exporting member can
prove to an importing member that its measures are equivalent, achieving
the same appropriate level of protection.75
While the SPS Agreement requires members to model their measures
after international guidelines, it still allows members to apply "measures
which will result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant international
standards, guidelines, or recommendations . ,76 However, if a member
66 See id. at25.
67 See id. at 145.
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 145; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 62, art. 2.
7' Id. art 5.
72id.
73 See id.; see also TREBILcOCK & HOWSE, supra note 64, at 147.
74 See id. at 145; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 62, art. 3(1).
75 See SPS Agreement, supra note 62, art. 4(1).
76 See id. arts. 3(1), 3(3).
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country decides to adopt more stringent standards, it must base its rationale
upon a scientific justification.77
Under the SPS Agreement, representatives from member countries
form a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures that must con-
vene regularly or as the need arises .78 The Committee must "implement the
provisions of this Agreement, ... encourage and facilitate ad hoc consulta-
tions or negotiations among Members on specific sanitary and phytosani-
tary issues, ... and monitor the process of international harmonization [of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures] ....,79
The adopted Protocol, which is analyzed later in this comment, has
wisely borrowed some of the flexible safety principles implemented in the
SPS Agreement. Like the SPS Agreement, the adopted Protocol sets a
minimum standard of regulation, but allows its members to maintain some
national political sovereignty and policy autonomy in establishing their own
regulations as long as those regulations are at least equivalent to the mini-
mum requirements.80 In addition, both the SPS Agreement and the Protocol
illustrate how countries can maintain the goals of economic growth through
cooperation, while establishing human and environmental protections.
However, as discussed later in an analysis of the adopted Protocol,
there is a need for a protocol that specifically addresses issues surrounding
the trade of GMOs. For example, because the SPS Agreement requires
members to adopt measures based on scientific evidence, it makes it
difficult for members to adopt measures when there are potential dangers
that scientists have yet to prove. Because the trade of GMOs involves
many potential, yet scientifically unproven dangers, the SPS Agreement
does not adequately address those issues.
IV. THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
While the WTO has established provisions to regulate agricultural
trade amongst its members, countries from around the world have made at-
tempts to establish an international agreement to regulate biodiversity. In
June 1992, countries met at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro to discuss
various environmental issues.81 Out of the Earth Summit, parties formed a
77 See id. art. 3(3); see also Paul E. Hagen & John Barlow Weiner, SYMPfOSIUM
ARTICLE: The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: New Rules for International Trade in Liv-
ingModified Organisms, 12 GEo. INT'L ENvm. L. Rlv. 697, 710 (2000) (stating that while
the SPS agreement also permits WTO members to take interim measures in the absence of
scientific evidence under article 5, parties generally cannot do so).
78 See SPS Agreement, supra note 62, arts. 12(1), 12(7).
7- Id. arts. 12(1), 12(2), 12(4).
so See TREBILCOCK & Howsa, supra note 64, at 147; for a more lengthy discussion of
flexibility of regulations, see infra Section IVE2.
S, See Biosafety Protocol Could Hinder International Biotech Trade, Says Analyst, FOOD
LABELING NEws, (Information Access Company Newsletter Database), Nov. 18, 1998, at 6.
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multilateral treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), to pro-
tect biodiversity.1
2
The CBD establishes a method for countries to work together "to en-
courage sustainable development and to slow the destruction of biodiver-
sity." °  There are currently 179 parties to the Convention.84 While the
United States is an observing participant, it is not a party to the treaty and
therefore has no voting rights regarding the provisions of the CBD."5 Thus,
the United States can participate in negotiations, but it does not have a final
vote in the adoption of any measures taken by the CBD, nor is the United
States required to abide by the CBD.
A. Biosafety Protocol
One of the goals of the CBD is to create a "biosafety protocol" to regu-
late the trade of GMOs.16 Specifically, the parties to the CBD want to es-
tablish "minimum regulatory standards for the exports of GMOs" to ensure
that GMOs are safe for the environment and human health.
7
To establish the biosafety protocol, parties to the CBD continued to
deal with key controversial issues, such as advanced informed agreement
("AIA"), risk assessments, and information exchange.8 s A proposed AIA
provision would have required prior governmental approval for every ex-
change of GMO products among scientists and every shipment of widely
traded commodities containing GMOs, including soybeans and corn.'
9
There was disagreement among parties on whether consent should be nec-
essary for every shipment and on whether both the importing country and
the exporting country must complete risk assessments.' Another issue was
the creation of more effective information technology to enhance the ex-
change of information about GMOs.91
B. Debate Over Biosafety Protocol
There has been great controversy over the final establishment of a bio-
safety protocol.92 Developing countries and many NGOs generally argue
82 id.
83 See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 16.
84 The Convention on Biological Diversity has 179 Parties: 178 Countries and the Euro-
pean Union, at http://www.biodiv.org/conv/cbd-ratification.asp?date (last visited on Jan. 17,
2001).
85 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 16.86 See id. at 5.
87 Id. at 5-6.
8' See id. at 21.
89 See supra note 81.
90 See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 21.
91 See id.
92 See id. at 7.
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for the establishment of a biosafety protocol with international standards
that all countries must meet in order to release GMOs into the environ-
ment.93 Because these developing countries do not have the resources to
conduct proper risk assessments on GMOs, they support universal standards
that require risk assessments, labeling requirements, and other safety meas-
ures. 94 Many NGOs are wary of the possible risks that GMOs pose to the
environment, specifically the risk of disruption of the ecological balance of
areas where they are introduced. 95
However, many industrialized countries, such as the United States, ad-
vocate voluntary guidelines rather than a biosafety protocol to regulate the
international trade of GMOs.96 Because industrialized countries have used
GMOs for some time, they are more familiar with the risks and benefits of
GMOs.97 Industrialized countries and biotechnology companies in those
countries contend that because many biotechnology companies already
comply with existing standards under the International Bio-Industry Forum
("IBF") Pledge, the risks of GMOs are insignificant and preventable. 98 In-
dustrialized countries also call for less stringent, voluntary standards regu-
lating GMOs because of the agricultural benefits of GMO crops, such as
genetically engineered resistance to certain insects. 99
C. Meetings Under Convention on Biological Diversity
Prior to CBD, the United Nations Environmental Programme
("UNEP") had already begun to debate whether a biosafety protocol should
be established)00 In 1993, a UNEP panel of scientific experts found that
there was inadequate scientific evidence to warrant a scientific protocol.'0 '
However, the UNEP experts did concede that a biosafety protocol "could
harmonize regulations."'1 2
After these UNEP findings, parties to the CBD met for the first time at
the first Conference of the Parties ("COP I") in Nassau, Bahamas from No-
vember 28 to December 9, 1994.' 0 At COP I, NGOs in attendance pro-
posed a moratorium on the export of GMOs until a biosafety protocol was
93 Id.
9' See id. at 7-8.
95 See id. at 7.




"' See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 37.
101 Id.
0 2 Id.
103 Id., citing Report of the First Meeting of the Conference to the Parties to the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), at http://
vww.biodiv.org/copl/cbdrepi.htnl (last visited Oct. 31, 1999) [hereinafter Cop I Report].
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established.' 4 The parties did not grant the moratorium 0 5 During COP I,
the parties created an open-ended ad hoc working group of experts to con-
sider the issue of biosafety ("Ad Hoc Group").' The purpose of the Ad
Hoc Group was to consider the merits of a biosafety protocol and to discuss
the potential risks that GMOs posed to biodiversity and the various risk as-
sessment procedures to control potential risks.'07
In an attempt to achieve its goals, the Ad Hoc Group met from July 24
to July 28, 1995 in Madrid, Spain.108 Because of its "open designation," the
meeting included attendees from eighty-four countries, seven UN bodies,
two intergovernmental organizations, and twenty-two NGOs.' °9 The debate
between industrialized and developing countries ensued." 0 As discussed
previously, while most industrialized nations argued for a voluntary system
of regulation of GMOs, developing countries and NGOs argued for a global
ban of GMOs."' While the parties did not reach an agreement on this is-
sue, they did agree that a protocol should be established to regulate GMOs
with possible adverse effects on biodiversity." 2 In addition, they agreed
that there was a need for risk assessment and management procedures and
methods of information exchange."
3
At its second meeting in November 1995 ("COP II"), the COP created
a new working group, the Open-Ended Ad-Hoc Working Group on Bio-
safety ("Biosafety Working Group"). 14 The parties created this working
group "to begin addressing AIA and the transboundary movement of
GMOs."' '
D. Sixth Meeting of the Biosafety Working Group
On February 22 and 23, 1999, in Cartagena Columbia, the Biosafety
Working Group met for its sixth and final meeting to date." 6 One hundred
and thirty countries, various UN organizations, intergovernmental organiza-
104 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 38.
105 Id.
107 Id.; see also COP I Report, supra note 103.
'
08 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 39; see also Report of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on Biosafety, UNEP Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, at http://www.upep.chlbio/cp2-&.html (last visited Oct. 31, 1999) [hereinafter
UNEP Conference of the Parties-2d Mtg].






4 id. at 42.
15 Redick et al., supra note 1, at 42.
16 BSWG Report 6, supra note 10.
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tions, and NGOs attended to negotiate a compromise on a biosafety proto-
col." 7 They drafted a protocol that would exempt gene-altered farm com-
modities and pharmaceuticals from regulation."' This exemption was the
focus of debate amongst the parties.'1 9 While the Miami Group, a con-
glomeration of countries including the United States, Canada, Australia,
Argentina, Uruguay and Chile argued that strict regulations on GMO crops
and pharmaceuticals would hinder international trade, Europe and most de-
veloping nations argued for stricter rules that would include the regulation
of these products.12
On February 24, 1999, negotiations collapsed as the parties could not
reach a compromise on a biosafety protocol."' Although more than 110
countries had agreed on a potential protocol, the Miami group blocked it.
22
The United States and its supporters were concerned with strict regulatory
measures, such as labeling requirements, included in the proposed protocol
by European and developing countries.'23 European countries and develop-
ing countries proposed the strict safety standards to prevent potential envi-
ronmental and health problems associated with the deliberate release of
GMOs.' 24 Many European countries advocate a ban or a serious restriction
on the release of GMOs for reasons of environmental and human safety,
and ethical objections to the manipulation of DNA in foods. 125 Although
talks ceased, the Biosafety Working Group agreed to continue to negotiate a
protocol before or during the May 2000 Conference of the Parties in Nai-
robi. 126
E. Montreal Meeting-January 24 to 29, 2000 and Beyond
After five years of negotiations, officials from the 130 CBD countries
finalized a legally binding protocol, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
("Cartagena Protocol or Protocol"), to regulate the international trade of
GMOs at a CBD meeting in Montreal. 27 Over 700 delegates from govern-
ments, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs attended the meeting to
negotiate the Cartagena Protocol, named for the place where it was
11 id.
"
8 Id.; see also Lambrecht, supra note 2, at A5.
19 See Lambrecht, supra note 2, at A5.
120Id.
121 Bill Lambrecht, Talks Collapse on Rules for Genetic Crops; U.S., Allies Blocked




125 See Larnbrecht, supra note 12, at Al.
26 Angela Sanchez, Environment: New Delay for Biosafety Protocol, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Feb. 25, 1999.
27 See Cartagena Protocol Press Release, supra note 4.
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drafted.128 The CBD opened for signature the agreed text of the Cartagena
Protocol at its COP meeting in Nairobi on May 15 to 26, 2000 (Fifth Ses-
sion of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity----"COP 5").129 At COP 5, sixty-four governments and the European
Union signed the Protocol, indicating their general support for the agree-
ment and their intention to be become legally bound by it 30 Since COP 5,
a total of eighty-one parties have signed the Protocol. However, only two
parties, Bulgaria and Trinidad and Tobago, have ratified it, thus becoming
legally bound to adhere to its principles. 2 Upon the ratification of the Pro-
tocol by fifty CBD countries, the Protocol will take legal force for its mem-
bers.1
33
1. Safety Measures in the Cartagena Protocol
The Cartagena Protocol contains many safety provisions to protect
biodiversity1 34 The parties premised the Protocol on the "precautionary
approach," as contained in the Rio Declaration on the Environment and De-
velopment, which permits parties to act absent clear scientific evidence or
based on non-scientific criteria. ' 5 Thus, parties can act to prevent potential
damage from the release of GMOs before that damage is definitively
proven. For example, Article 1 of the Protocol states:
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol
is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modem
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and
specifically focusing on transboundary movements.'36
In Articles 7 through 10, the Protocol defines the Advance Informed
Agreement procedure ("AA"). 37 At its meeting in Montreal, the parties
agreed that these strict AIA procedures only apply to seeds, live fish, and
128 id.
129 Id.
130 See Mwagni, supra note 5; see also Frequently Asked Questions about the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol/FAQs.html (last visited




134 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, at
http://www.biodiv.orgfbiosafe/Protocollhtml/Biosafe-Prot.html (last visited on Dec. 13,
2000) [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol Text].
135 See Hagen & Weiner, supra note 77, at 710.
136 Id. (emphasis added); see also Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 1 (em-
phasis added).
137 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, arts. 7-10.
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other LMOs that will be intentionally introduced to the environment as op-
posed to LMOs intended for direct use as food or feed.1
38
Under AIA requirements, the exporter of GMOs must ensure notifica-
tion in writing to the importer prior to the international trade of potentially
dangerous GMOs1 39 As stated in Article 8 and Annex I, information re-
quired in notifications includes the identity of the GMO, the characteristics
of both the recipient and donor organisms related to biosafety, a description
of the genetic modification, the quantity of the goods, suggestions of safe
handling, storage, transport and use of the GMOs, and the regulatory status
of the GMOs in the country of export.14° After receiving notification, the
party of import has ninety days to acknowledge the receipt of the notifica-
tion and communicate to the notifier whether the transboundary movement
may proceed under Articles 9 and 10.141 In addition, the party of import has
270 days from the date of receipt of notification to communicate its deci-
sion whether to proceed to the party of export and to the Biosafety Clear-
ing-House, an international information clearing-house mechanism to
facilitate the exchange of information regarding GMOs. 142
Article 12 states that a party of import "may at any time, in light of
new scientific information on potential adverse effects [of LMOs] .. .re-
view and change a decision regarding an intentional transboundary move-
ment."' 143 In turn, the party of export has an equal opportunity to dispute the
changed decision by requesting the party of import to review its decision.'44
The parties to the CBD wisely included these strict requirements in or-
der to prevent the accidental release of potentially dangerous GMOs.
The adopted Protocol also contains labeling requirements. 145 Under
Article 18, when shipping LMOs that are intended for intentional introduc-
tion into the environment, parties must provide accompanying documenta-
tion that:
[Cilearly identifies them as living modified organisms; specifies the identity and
relevant traits and/or characteristics, any requirements for the safe handling, stor-
age, transport and use, the contact point for further information and, as appropri-
ate, the name and address of the importer and exporter; and contains a
declaration that the movement is in conformity with the requirements of this Pro-
tocol applicable to the exporter.1 46
138 Cartagena Protocol Press Release, supra note 4.
139 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 8.
141 Id. art. 8, annex I.
141 See id. art. 9.
142 Id. art. 10.
'
431d. art. 12
144 Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 12.
141 See id. art. 18.
146 id.
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Parties should use these labeling requirements to avoid any potential
adverse effects on biodiversity, including risks to human health, by the re-
lease of LMOs into the environment.' 47
However, at the Montreal meeting, the United States negotiated a con-
cession with respect to the labeling requirement: bulk shipments of goods
for food, feed, or processing only require a label that states that the products
"may contain" GMOs. 4  This concession only weakens the labeling re-
quirement measure slightly because the dangers of transboundary move-
ment of food, feed, or processing goods does not warrant the specific
labeling requirements necessary for more experimental GMOs, such as
GMO seeds, intended for intentional introduction into the environment.
However, the Protocol's labeling requirements for food do not address the
concerns of consumers who want to make conscious decisions about
whether to ingest GMO foods; the label is only seen by the actual producers
and buyers of shipments and not by the consumers.
Not only does the Protocol require parties to label LMOs, it also re-
quires parties to establish and maintain risk management procedures to
regulate potential risks of the transboundary movement of LMOs.'49 Under
Article 16, each party must adopt measures that require risk assessments to
be conducted prior to the initial release of an LMO. 5 ° In addition, each
party must ensure that "any living modified organism... has undergone an
appropriate period of observation that is commensurate with its life-cycle or
generation time before it is put to its intended use.
''5
The Protocol contains a retroactive safety provision, Article 17, which
discusses the unintentional transboundary movements of LMOs and emer-
gency measures addressing these unintentional movements. 152 If a party un-
intentionally releases LMOs into the environment, it must immediately
notify affected and potentially affected countries, the Biosafety Clearing-
House, and, where appropriate, international organizations with jurisdiction
in the affected area or areas.153 Moreover, the party responsible for the re-
lease must consult with the affected or potentially affected parties to deter-
mine any appropriate emergency measures to minimize adverse effects on
biodiversity.
147 See id.
"' See Bill Lambrecht, Nations OK Pact on Genetically Modified Foods; Treaty Regu-
lates Technology but Allows Its Use; Monsanto, Greenpeace Hail Accord, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al; see also Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 18.
149 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 16.
150 See id.
51 Id.
152 See id. art. 17.
153 id.
154 Id.
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Finally, the Protocol also requires the establishment of procedures for
liability and redress under Article 27.155 The Protocol calls for the adoption
of "a process ... of international rules and procedures in the field of liabil-
ity and redress for damage resulting from the transboundary movement of
living modified organisms" within four years.'56
2. Facilitation of Procedures in the Protocol
Not only does the Protocol provide various safety measures, it also
contains provisions that facilitate the transboundary movement of LMOs.1
5 7
Article 13 of the Protocol provides a simplified procedure for the trans-
boundary movement of LMOs previously established as safe.158 The party
of import may specify in advance to the Biosafety Clearing-House cases in
which the transboundary movement of LMOs and the notification can take
place simultaneously. 
5 9
In addition, under Article 14, the adopted Protocol allows parties to en-
ter into multilateral, bilateral, and regional agreements and arrangements
with other parties and non-parties that can substitute for adherence to the
Protocol.160 These agreements must include safety provisions that "do not
result in a lower level of protection than that provided for by the Proto-
col.",161  Parties must inform each other, using the Biosafety Clearing-
House, of any such agreements.' 62 The provisions of the Protocol will not
affect intentional transboundary movements under these bilateral, regional,
or multilateral agreements. 61 This article also allows a party to determine
whether its own domestic regulations should apply to specific imports to it,
as long as the party notifies the Biosafety Clearing-House of its decision)
64
Under Article 20, the Protocol encourages free exchange of informa-
tion regarding LMOs. 6  As discussed above, the Protocol establishes a
Biosafety Clearing-House in order to "[fjacilitate the exchange of scientific,
technical, environmental and legal information on, and experience with, liv-
ing modified organisms.', 166 This free exchange of information addresses
the inability of developing countries to make informed decisions on
whether to permit the import of LMOs and how to implement the Proto-
155 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 27.
156id.
157 See generally Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134.
158 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 13.
159 See id.
160 See id. art. 14.
161 Id.
162 Id.163 See id.
164 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 14.
161 See id. art. 20.
66 id.
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Col.1 67 The Biosafety Clearing-House serves as the means to provide access
to information made available by the parties. 168 The Clearing-House will
use the Internet as a main vehicle to distribute information. 169 This
information includes national regulations for the implementation of the
Protocol, information required in AIA procedures, any multilateral,
bilateral, and regional agreements, summaries of risk assessments or
environmental review of LMOs, and final decisions regarding the import of
specific LMOs.170 Under the Cartagena Protocol, governments will indicate
whether they are willing to accept imports of agricultural goods that contain
LMOs by communicating their decisions to this Internet-based Biosafety
Clearing-House. 171
Finally, Article 22 of the Protocol addresses capacity-building. 172 The
parties recognize that for the purpose of effectively implementing the Pro-
tocol, they must develop and strengthen human resources and institutional
capacities in biosafety in developingcountries, especially in least developed
and small island developing states. When addressing this issue of capac-
ity-building in biosafety, parties must consider a developing country's
needs for financial resources and access to, and transfer of, technology.' 74
Thus, for developing country parties to meet the requirements of the Proto-
col, all parties must facilitate the development of institutional resources in
those countries with both financial and technological support.
3. Financial Mechanism for the Protocol
An analysis of the financial mechanism behind the Protocol is also im-
portant to determine whether the Protocol will be effective. Before the Pro-
tocol is implemented, it is difficult to determine whether its funding is
adequate to implement the day-to-day procedures (e.g., filing documents,
maintaining the Biosafety Clearinghouse, keeping records of dangerous
GMO products) necessary to enforce the procedures established under the
Protocol. This section gives a brief description of some of the funding al-
ready set aside to implement the Cartagena Protocol to give readers a basic
understanding of its financial mechanism. 175
167 see id.
168 See id.
169 See Cartagena Protocol Press Release, supra note 4.
170 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 20.
171 See Cartagena Protocol Press Release, supra note 4; see also Cartagena Protocol Text,
supra note 134, art. 20.
172 See id. art. 22.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 Please note that the following is only a brief summary. It was difficult to obtain com-
plete information on the subject of funding. In addition, a complete analysis of funding
would go beyond the scope of this article.
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In Article 28, the parties define the financial mechanism and resources
for the Protocol.' 6 The Protocol incorporates the financial resources and
mechanism provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Articles
20 and 21 respectively."
Article 20 of the CBD states that each contracting party to the CBD
must provide "financial support and incentives" for national activities that
attempt to achieve protection of biodiversity. 178  In addition, developed
countries must provide additional financial resources "to enable developing
country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of imple-
menting measures which fulfil[sic] the obligations of this Convention. " 179
In addition to requiring financial support, Article 20 encourages voluntary
contributions from parties as well18 Finally, developed countries may also
provide financial resources to developing countries through bilateral, re-
gional, and other multilateral channels.
Article 21 provides for a financial mechanism "for the provision of fi-
nancial resources to developing country Parties... on a grant or conces-
sional basis. 182 The mechanism functions under the authority and guidance
of the Conference of the Parties ("COP").8 3 At its first meeting, the COP
decided that the Global Environmental Facility ("GEF") would continue as
the institutional structure to operate the financial mechanism of the CBD. 
184
The GEF is a restructured financial institutional structure, "established to
forge international cooperations and finance action to address four critical
threats to the global environment... [including] biodiversity loss .... ,,185
Article 21 also reiterates encouragement for voluntary contributions from
developed country parties and by other countries and sources.
186
Article 28 of the Protocol also addresses the need for financing capac-
ity-building of developing countries, as described above.18 7 It requires the
176 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 28.
'77See id.17
" Convention on Biological Diversity - Convention Text: Article 20. Financial Re-
sources, at http:/vvww.biodiv.org/chmlconv/art20.htm (last modified May 25, 2000) [here-




18 Convention on Biological Diversity - Convention Text: Article 21. Financial Mecha-
nism, at http:/Ilvwv.biodiv.org/chmnconv/art2l.htm (last modified May 25, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter CBD Article 21].
183 Id.; see also Financial Mechanism, at http://vww.biodiv.orgtfm/frm.html (last modi-
fied May 25,2000).
184 See id.
185 What is the Global Environment Facility?, at http://www.gefweb.org/What-is-theG
EF/wvhatisjthe gef.htmnl (last visited Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter What is the GEE].
186 See CBD Article 21, supra note 182.
187 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 28.
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COP to take into account the financial needs of developing countries, in-
cluding least developed and small island developing states, in their efforts
to implement their capacity-building requirements."'
Adhering to its Article 28 requirements, the COP reconfirmed its ap-
proved year 2000 budget of US$ 1,078,800 for the Protocol on Biosafety at
its January meeting in Montreal. s9 The COP also noted funds received
from the Special Voluntary Trust Fund ("BE") for Additional Voluntary
Contributions in Support of Approved Activities, a trust of voluntary funds
discussed above, in the amount of US$ 306,000 for 1999-2000.190 The COP
used these voluntary funds for meetings, the Biosafety Clearing-House, and
a roster of experts in fields relevant to risk assessment and management. 19'
At its meeting in Nairobi in May 2000, the COP set its budget for the bien-
nium 2001-2002.192 The budget includes the following funding for the Bio-
safety Protocol: US$ 100,000 per year for regional meetings of the
Biosafety Protocol, US$ 483,600 per year for the ICCP, an undecided
amount for implementation, and an undecided amount for biosafety in gen-
eral. 1
93
4. Relationship with Other International Agreements
One of the most disputed issues that the parties negotiated when estab-
lishing the Cartagena Protocol is the relationship between the Protocol and
other international agreements, specifically agreements under the World
Trade Organization (,"WTO"). 19 4  The dispute stems from the different
premises on which the agreements operate. 195
While environmental agreements [like this Protocol] are premised on the precau-
tionary principle (which states that potentially dangerous activities can be re-
stricted even before they can be scientifically proven to cause serious damage),
decisions under trade law [WTOJ require "sufficient scientific evidence." 196
8 See id.
189 See Decisions of the Conference of Parties, Montreal 2000: EM-I/3. Adoption of the
Cartagena Protocol and Interim Arrangements, at http://www.biodiv.orgldecisionsfExCOPl/
html/excop-l-dec-03-e.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2000) [hereinafter EM-113 Decision].
'
90 See id. § IV.
91 See id. §§ IV, II.
192 See Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity at Its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, 15-26 May 2000: V/22. Budget for the Pro-
gramme of Work for the Biennium 2001-2002, at http:lwww.biodiv.orgldecisionslcop5/
html/COP-5-Dec-22-e.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter V/22 Decision].
'93 See id. Table 1.
194 See Cartagena Protocol Press Release, supra note 4.
195 id.
196 id.
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Under the Cartagena Protocol, the Protocol and the WTO "are to be mutu-
ally supportive." 97 However, the Protocol is not to affect "the rights and
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements." ' '
This subordination to existing international agreements may reduce the
effectiveness of the Protocol. For example, if WTO trading laws do not re-
quire the strict safety measures adopted in this Protocol, WTO members,
even if they are also parties to the CBD, may be able to avoid compliance
because of the subordinate position of the CBD. In addition, WTO and
CBD members could also claim that one of their members is using a Proto-
col restriction, without scientific evidence, as a mere guise for trade advan-
tage.
Because the United States is not a party to the CBD, and thus not re-
quired to follow the Protocol, the effectiveness of the Protocol may also be
weakened. However, American industry must comply with the Protocol
rules when exporting to countries that are parties to the CBD because if
American companies do not comply, party countries will not accept Ameri-
can shipments. 99 In addition, federal United States officials at the Montreal
meeting stated that the United States would honor the treaty.200 This prom-
ise raises the issue of whether the United States can be trusted to honor a
treaty without being legally bound to it.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
Now that they have adopted the Cartagena Protocol, the parties should
ratify and implement it. The two main factions, industrialized countries and
developing countries, have sensibly negotiated a protocol to regulate the
transboundary movement of GMOs. A compromise that establishes basic
regulatory standards, like the Cartagena Protocol, will benefit both fac-
tions.20' There are numerous reasons to ratify this Protocol.
First, the deliberate release of GMOs is an international issue.20 2 Be-
cause the deliberate release of GMOs in one country could potentially affect
the population or environment of another country or countries, international
standards should be established. 203 For example, as discussed previously,
197 Id.; see also Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, preamble.
198 Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, preamble; see also Cartagena Protocol Press
Release, supra note 4.
'
99 See Andrew Pollack, 130 Nations Agree on Safety Rules for Biotech Food, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2000, at 1.
200 Id.
201 See Kim, supra note 53, at 1162. "Harmonization of international regulations for the
deliberate release of GMOs into the environment is needed to encourage the development of
genetically engineered products, to promote international trade, and to protect human health
and the environment with common safety standards." Id.
202 See Kim, supra note 53, at 1168.
203 See id. at 1169.
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wheat grown in one country that has been genetically altered to resist pesti-
cides could pass its pesticide-resistant genetic qualities onto weeds growing
in another country, potentially disrupting the ecological cycles of the latter
country's environment. 2° Thus, if the COP can ratify international stan-
dards for the deliberate release of GMOs, all countries will receive greater
protection from the potential dangers of the release.205
Second, because there are many potential risks to both the environment
and human health from the deliberate release of GMOs, the COP should rat-
ify the Protocol to manage these potential risks.206 The COP rightfully in-
voked the "precautionary approach" when establishing the Cartagena
Protocol. Because scientists have not been able to predict the future harms
of GMOs with certainty, 207 and these harms may not be easily halted or re-
versed,20 8 the COP should implement strict regulations until the safety of
specific GMOs can be scientifically proven.
As stated in Article 4 of its text, the Protocol regulations apply only to
LMOs "that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human
health., 20 9 Thus, once scientists have proven that a specific LMO may not
pose an "adverse effect," that LMO will no longer be subject to the regula-
tions of the Protocol.210 This gives biotechnology companies, like Mon-
santo, incentives to conduct scientific research to prove the safety of their
products. While scientists conduct research on the safety of LMOs, the
Protocol allows a loosening of regulations, such as its simplified procedures
for transboundary movement of LMOs, "provided that adequate measures
are applied to ensure the safe intentional transboundary movement of living
modified organisms.,' 2"
Third, the COP should ratify the adopted Protocol because it provides a
central information clearing-house to disperse information about LMOs.
As previously discussed, under the Protocol, the Biosafety Clearing-House
becomes the central body with information about LMOs, such as potential
risks and scientific studies. Thus, the free flow of information mandated
in the Protocol can assist developing countries without information about
GMOs in making informed decisions about whether to allow GMO im-
ports.1 3 In addition, the COP should implement the Biosafety Clearing-
214 See id. at 1168.
115 See id. at 1200.
206 See id.. For a discussion of potential risks, see supra Section IC.
207 Kim, supra note 53, at 1200.
208 Id. at 1169.
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House immediately in order to make information readily available for coun-
tries to establish their own laws on the regulation of GMOs until the Proto-
col can be ratified.1 4 As use of the Internet continues to expand globally,
the Biosafety Clearing-House should use the Internet as a main source of
information disbursement.
Fourth, the Protocol should be ratified because it provides a minimum,
uniform standard of regulation.215 This uniform standard has benefits for
both importing countries and biotechnology companies. 1 6 An international
protocol allows for the safe trade of GMOs across international borders,
while it benefits companies by establishing one set of uniform regulations
that the industry must follow. 21 7 Presently, companies marketing a new
GMO must abide by the regulations of each country, raising the cost of
marketing the product around the world.218 Adoption of a uniform standard
would reduce these marketing cost trade barriers to make GMOs more read-
ily available to consumers in the global marketplace.219
The Cartagena Protocol also maintains flexibility as it allows countries
to adopt equivalent standards to those in the Protocol.220 Under the WTO's
SPS Agreement, member countries have discretion to establish their own
trade regulations as long as those standards are equivalent to the importing
221unethPrtcl
country's appropriate level of protection. Similarly, under the Protocol,
parties can establish outside agreements regarding the transboundary
movements among themselves as long as those agreements do not result in
a lower level of protection provided in the Protocol.
222
Fifth, by establishing a uniform protocol, the COP can stop the exploi-
tation of countries with less stringent regulations or countries without regu-
lations. 223  Currently, biotechnology companies often choose to conduct
field testing and marketing in countries with little or no regulation of
GMOs.224 Usually, developing countries do not have regulations because of
a lack of information or a lack of financial resources to establish regula-
tions.22 Under the Protocol, because all countries, both industrialized and
214 See Sanchez, supra note 126. "If and when it is adopted, the Cartagena Protocol must
be ratified by each signatory government, meaning it could take three or four years to go into
effect...." Id.215 See Kim, supra note 53, at 1202.
216 See id. at 1200.
217 id.
218 See id. at 1196.
219 See id. at 1200.
220 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 14.
221 See SPS Agreement, supra note 62, art. 4.
222 See Cartagena Protocol Text, supra note 134, art. 14.
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developed, would have established regulations, biotechnology companies
would have less incentive to continue to use developing countries as testing
grounds for their products.
Sixth, the ratification of the Protocol may decrease public opposition to
GMOs. In countries around the world, people are publicly opposing GMO
foods. 26 For example, in Europe, critics of GMO food have sabotaged test
plots of GMO crops. 7 In June 1999 in Brazil, a federal judge banned the
sales of Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean seeds until the Brazilian gov-
ernment could set up biosafety regulations.2 8 Various representatives from
the Brazilian government have questioned the safety of transgenic foods .229
For example, Rio Grande do Sul Governor Olivia Dutra stopped transgenic-
seed production at 79 test sites, claiming the sites lacked environment-
impact studies.2 0 Since Brazil is the world's second-largest soybean pro-
ducer, Monsanto wants to market its transgenic soybean seeds there.23 If
the COP can ratify and implement the Protocol, public opposition to GMO
foods may decrease, opening up markets, such as Brazil, to transgenic
seeds.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROTOCOL-VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS
A. Description
In addition to an international protocol, there have been other alterna-
tives proposed to regulate the international trade of GMOs. The Aspen In-
stitute advanced the "alternative path" concept to environmental regulation
in 1993 22. In their article, Private Legal Mechanisms for Regulating the
Risks of Genetically Modified Organisms: An Alternative Path Within the
Biosafety Protocol, Thomas Redick, William Reavey, and Dirk Michels ar-
gue that the parties to the CBD should permanently adopt the "alternative
path" concept to the regulation of the deliberate release of GMOs into the
environment. 233 Under the two-track approach to managing the risks of
GMOs, already agreed to by the parties to the CBD, companies who could
demonstrate a net environmental benefit to the release of GMOs would be
subject to a voluntary monitoring system rather than the stricter case-by-
14
case analysis under the Protocol .
226 See Barboza, supra note 32, at Al.
227 Id.




232 See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 56 (citing Dorothy P. Bowers, The Alternative Path:
A New Blueprint, ENvmL. F., Mar./Apr. 1997, at 36-7).
233 See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 55.
234 id.
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The authors discuss various alternatives to regulate GMOs, such as al-
ready existing programs, the ISO series of standards, and the possibility of
the creation of a new corporate ethic.?35 Many corporations have already
developed self-regulating environmental protection programs because of
conscientious executives or because of the cost-effectiveness of self-
regulation. z6 For example, Johnson & Johnson has established an envi-
ronmental program where a steering committee, consisting of vice presi-
dents, meets to discuss the incorporation of new environmental protection
methods into the company's strategic plan.3
The authors also suggest that intellectual property licensing agree-
ments, another already existing mechanism, could help regulate environ-
mental risks.2 8  For example, Monsanto Corporation has already
established a licensing agreement for Bollagard® cotton, where cotton
growers must agree to create a buffer zone of non-genetically altered crops
surrounding an area of genetically altered crops.' 9 These buffer zones
diminish the exposure of insect populations to the genetically engineered
crop in order to prevent the development of insect resistance to the 2
Another alternative discussed is the ISO series of standards.24 The
ISO 14000 Series of Environmental Contract Specifications are interna-
tional standards for environmental management.: 42 Redick, Reavey, and
Michels suggest that the ISO series "could provide the biotechnology indus-
try with standardized legal provisions for internal environmental corporate
policies.' 2 43 Under these provisions, a party may adopt third party certifica-
tion, where an outside firm confirms the party's compliance with environ-
mental regulations as part of an environmental management system.
244
Finally, the authors consider the possibility of multinational biotech-
nology companies as catalysts for environmental "sustainability. 245 "'Sus-
tainability' is generally defined as the management of 'natural systems for,,,46-
the perpetuation of the human species now and in the future. They en-
courage "conscientious consumers .... developing nations, and multina-
2 5 See id.
236 See id. at 57.
237 Id. at 59.
M See id. at 60.
23' See id. at 60.
240 ld.
241 See id. at 62.
242 id.
213 Id. at 62-63 (citing Henry P. Baer, Jr., Note, ISO 14000: Potential Compliance and
Prevention Guidelines for EPA and DOJ, 7 FORDHAMENVTL. L.J. 927, 934 (1996)).
244 See Redick et al., supra note 1, at 63.
245 See id. at 72.
246 Id. (citing Celia Campbell-Mon, Objective and Tools of Environmental Law, in
SUSTAINABLE ENVmONiENTAL LAW: NTEGRATING NATURAL RESOURCES AND POLLUTION
ABATEMENT LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. Eds., 1993)).
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tional corporations creating sustainable GMOs" to come together "to pro-
mote the use and consumption of sustainable GMOs."2 47 Biotechnology
companies, such as Monsanto, argue that the dissemination of "new infor-
mation technology may be the key to sustainable development."2 4 For ex-
ample, because of discoveries in new information technology, scientists can
genetically alter crops to be insect resistant, eliminating labor hours and
toxic residues connected to the production and disbursement of pesti-
cides.249 Thus, the authors argue for a biosafety protocol "that encourages
exports of GMOs and requires information dissemination" in order to "unite
NGO and industry interests in search for a sustainable future."
'' 0
B. Analysis of Voluntary Regulations
A voluntary system of self-regulation of GMOs will not lead to com-
pliance for numerous reasons. First, there is too much money involved in
the production and sale of GMOs to allow private companies, whose pri-
mary interest is to profit, to self-regulate. For example, American Home
Products, which acquired Monsanto in June 1998, made over US$ 2 billion
in net agricultural sales in 1998 and projected just under US$ 2 billion in
net agricultural sales in 1999.21 Because of this large financial interest,
biotechnology companies, such as Monsanto, may be guided by economics
rather than environmental safety. For instance, after a Cornell University
study showed that genetically altered corn could stunt the development of
the monarch butterfly, creating greater controversy regarding the safety of
GMOs, some of the large biotechnology companies financed a scientific
conference to discuss the safety of gene-altered corn.2 2 However, prior to
the conference, conference staff members issued a press release announcing
that the conference would show that genetically engineered corn does not
harm the monarch butterfly, although many scientists acknowledged that
their research was incomplete.2 3 Announcements like this indicate that
private biotechnology companies cannot be left to self-regulate.
Second, biotechnology companies' efforts to hire influential United
States governmental officials in order to improve public opinion of GMO
foods also indicates that the industry cannot be trusted to regulate itself.
For example, in the fall of 1998, when the debate on the safety of GMO
foods percolated in Ireland, Monsanto flew a group of Irish journalists to
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the United States to tour its labs. 4 While in the United States, the journal-
ists received a surprise visit to the Oval Office of the White House, coordi-
nated by Marcia Hale, an employee of Monsanto, who was the President's
director of intergovernmental affairs. 5 Thus, Monsanto's efforts, and
similar efforts by other biotechnology companies, to improve public opin-
ion of GMO foods by doling out special favors also indicate that the bio-
technology industry cannot be trusted to regulate itself.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the dangers of the unregulated transboundary movement
of GMO products calls for standard international regulations. The parties to
the CBD have adopted a protocol that can curb these dangers, while still al-
lowing for the continuation of free trade of GMOs. While the compromises
in the Protocol still leave potential problems unanswered, in its entirety, the
Cartagena Protocol provides sound international regulations of GMOs.
Thus, because of the merits of the Cartagena Protocol, the parties to the
CBD should ratify and implement it as soon as possible.
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